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TARGETING TAX DOLLARS MORE
EFFICIENTLY: PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS
TO THE 421-a REAL PROPERTY TAX
EXEMPTION
I.

Introduction

Section 421-a of the Real Property Tax Law' awards a tax ex-

emption to building owners who construct new multi-family housing
units2 in designated areas of New York City,3 provided that: (1) the
development occurs on vacant, predominantly vacant, 5 or underutilized6

1. See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987).
2. Multiple dwelling is defined as "a dwelling which is to be occupied or is
occupied as the residence or home of three or more families living independently
of one another, whether such dwelling is rented or owned as a cooperative or
condominium." Id. § 421-a(l)(c). The developers of hotels are ineligible to receive
such an exemption. Id. § 421-a(2)(a).
3. Id. § 421-a(2)(e)(i)-(iii), (2)(a)(ii)(A)-(C), (2)(a)(iii)(A)-(D) (McKinney 1984 &
Supp. 1987); see infra note 71 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
applicability of § 421-a to New York City.
4. Vacant is not defined in the § 421-a legislation. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW
§ 421-a (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987). The legislation provides, however, that
the agency may define the term. Id. § 421-a(3)(iv). "The local housing agency may
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this section, not
inconsistent with the provisions hereof ..
" Id.; see also Housing and Development
Administration Rules and Regulations Governing 421 Partial Tax Exemption,
§ 2.5(3)(a) (1982). Vacant land is defined as "land, including land under water,
which contains no enclosed, permanent improvement. Fences, sheds, garage attendants' booths, piers, bulkheads, lighting fixtures, and similar items, or any improvement having an assessed value of less than $2,000 shall not constitute an
enclosed, permanent improvement." Id.
5. Predominantly vacant is not defined in the § 421-a legislation. N.Y. REAL
PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987). For a discussion of the
impact caused by the absence of a definition, see supra note 4. See also Housing
and Development Administration Rules and Regulations Governing 421 Partial Tax
Exemption, § 2.5(3)(b) (1982). Predominantly vacant land is defined as "a plot of
land on which not more than fifteen percent of the land area contained enclosed,
permanent improvements. Fences, sheds, garage attendants' booths, pier bulkheads,
lighting fixtures and similar items, or any improvement having an assessed value
of less than $2,000 shall not constitute an enclosed, permanent improvement." Id.
6. Underutilized land is not defined in the § 421-a legislation. N.Y. REAL
PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987). For a discussion of the
impact caused by the absence of a definition, see supra note 4. See also Housing
and Development Administration Rules and Regulations Governing 421 Partial Tax
Exemption § 2.5(3)(c) (1982). Underutilized land is defined as:
[L]and or space which was under-utilized by virtue of the fact that: (i) It
was improved with a residential building or buildings (A) whose aggregate
occupied zoning rooms numbered not more than twenty percent of the
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land, or land improved with a non-conforming use;7 and (2) the owner
continues to pay at least the prior tax assessment throughout the period
of the exemption.8 The stated purpose of the section 421-a real property tax exemption (the exemption, the program, or section 421-a)
is to provide incentives so that developers will construct safe and

habitable dwellings in New York City. 9 In its application, a rather
limited type of housing stock is being developed. Developers of luxury
maximum number of zoning rooms allowed by the Zoning Resolution
and where the total number of self-contained dwelling units on the land
did not exceed the ratio, as applicable, per full thousand square feet of
lot . . . or (B) whose aggregate occupied zoning rooms numbered not
more than 6.66 percent of the maximum number of zoning rooms allowed
by the Zoning Resolution; provided that where the lot is divided by
district boundaries, the Commissioner shall determine the appropriate
ratio in relation to the permitted aggregate density of such lot under the
Zoning Resolution, and if the land is in a commercial district, the applicant
may use the ratio or its equivalent in the corresponding residential district; /
and provided further that if the land or space includes air rights over
residential buildings not to be demolished, such buildings will not be
considered in computing either the ratio of occupied zoning rooms or
the ratio of units to area set forth above, though the air rights from
such buildings may be considered in computing either ratio set forth
above; (ii) It consisted of air rights above a public roadway, waterway,
railroad right of way, public buildings, or other similar property used
by the general public; or (iii) It was improved with a non-residential
building or buildings (a) each of which contained (i) no more than the
permissible floor area ratio for nonresidential buildings in the zoning
district in question and (ii) a floor area ratio which was 20% or less of
the maximum [floor area ratio] for residential buildings, or (b) each of
which had an assessed valuation equal to or less than twenty percent of
the assessed valuation of the land on which the building or buildings
were situated, or (c) which, by reason of the building's configuration,
or substantial structural defects not brought about by deferred maintenance practices or intentional conduct, could no longer be functionally
or economically utilized, on the operative date, in the capacity in which
it was formerly utilized.
Id. See infra notes 157-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of litigation
regarding the definition of underutilized.
7. Land improved with a non-conforming use is not defined in the § 421-a
legislation. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987).

For a discussion of the impact caused by the absence of a definition, see supra
note 4. See also Housing and Development Administration Rules and Regulations
Governing 421 Partial Tax Exemption § 2.5 (3)(d) (1982). Land improved with a
non-conforming use is "defined in the same manner as that term was defined in
the Zoning Resolution in effect on the operative date." Id.
8. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(2)(b)(i) (McKinney 1984). See infra

notes 75-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the phasing out of the
exemption.
9. Memorandum of Legislative Representative of City of New York, reprinted
in [1971] N.Y. Laws 2551 (McKinney) [hereinafter Legislative Memorandum]. The
representative stated: "No efforts should be spared to increase the number of safe
and decent dwelling units in our cities." Id.
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buildings, such as the Trump Tower, are the primary beneficiaries
of the exemption.'"
Although it is recognized that the construction of housing is an
area worthy of legislative action and that section 421-a has laudable
goals, there has been opposition to the program." Political rhetoric
and posturing renders objective analysis of the program extremely
difficult. Public interest groups who condemn the program 2 have
cited the huge sum of tax dollars the exemption has excused, 3 the
high income levels of the residents of the buildings, 4 and the luxurious nature of the housing constructed under the program. 5 On
the other hand, proponents assert that the inflated costs of purchasing
land and constructing buildings in New York City necessitate the
exemption; 6 that it has enhanced the city's tax base; 7 and that its
overall impact has been, and will continue to be, beneficial to the
city.' 8

10. 421a: A Subsidy that Cost $551 Million, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1987, at RI,
cols. 1, 3 ("spokesmen for the real-estate industry admit that the 421a program primarily produced luxury apartments") [hereinafter Subsidy].
11. See generally H. ACHTENTUCH, F. DomuRAD, R. MESSINGER & J. SILVERS,
THE RICH GET RICHER, PART II: 421A TAX BREAKS IN NEw YORK CITY 1981-1983,
(1984) (report issued by New York Public Interest Group criticizing § 421-a)
[hereinafter RICH GET RiCHER]; Letter from Rev. Donald Sakano of Catholic Charities,
Archdiocese of New York to Mayor Edward I. Koch (Nov. 5, 1984) (available at
Fordham Urban Law Journal office) (discussing reasons to discontinue § 421-a)
[hereinafter Sakano letter].
12. See supra note 11.
13. RICH GET RICHER, supra note 11, at 1.
14. Id. at 3; Sakano letter, supra note 11, at 2 ("production of tax-subsidized
rental housing for upper income people is a waste of our city's tax base").
15. RICH GET RICHER, supra note 11, at 20-24.
16. HearingBefore the Board of Estimate on 421-a (Nov. 29, 1984) (unpublished
testimony of Willa Appel, Executive Director of the Citizen's Housing & Planning
Council) (available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office) [hereinafter Appel
testimony]; see Hearing Before the City Council Committee on Housing and Buildings
(May 3, 1985) (unpublished statement submitted by Real Estate Board of New York,
Inc.) (available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office).
17. K.

FORD,

HOUSING

[hereinafter HousNo

POLICY

AND

THE

URBAN

MIDDLE

CLASS

56-58 (1978)

POLICY].

18. Biderman, The 'Cost' of 421a, N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1987, at R22, col. 5
(author is New York City's Commissioner of Finance) [hereinafter The 'Cost']. Bider-

man stated:
When it became obvious that the program would expire in November

1985, developers rushed into construction, throwing 25,000 housing units

into the market at once, a 20-year high.
Obviously, the program's benefits are such a strong inducement to
construction that developers were willing to risk flooding the market and
leaving units empty to gain benefits provided by the program. If the

1080

FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. XV

This Note examines whether the 421-a program should remain
applicable to all multi-family dwellings, including luxury rentals,
cooperatives and condominiums. Part II provides an overview of
the concept of real estate tax exemptions. Part III examines the
legislative history behind the section 421-a program. Part IV then
assesses the merits of 421-a's application to luxury housing. Based
on that analysis, this Note concludes that the present standards for
granting exemptions represent an inefficient use of tax dollars. Therefore, the legislature should act to limit the exemption to rental units,
including luxury housing. The high costs of constructing buildings,
the rent regulation system, and the low vacancy rate of rental units
dictate that such units remain eligible for the exemption.
II.

Tax Exemptions

This section will discuss the legislature's power to tax and to
exempt, as well as the philosophy and goals of tax incentives.
A.

The Power to Tax and the Power to Exempt

The state legislature's power to tax property and to exempt certain
property from taxation is derived from several provisions in the New
20
York State Constitution. 9 This power is subject to the due process
program made such a big impact in Manhattan, how much more important
is it to the other boroughs where over 90 percent of the future 421a
benefits are expected? The program has 'costs,' but its benefits have far
outweighed the 'costs' incurred.
Id.
19. N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 17 (cases in which private or local bills shall not
be passed); id. § 22 (tax laws to state tax and object); id. § 23 (when yeas and
nays necessary; three-fifths to constitute quorum); id. art. VIII, § 10 (limitations
on amount to be raised by real estate taxes for local purposes; exceptions); id.
§ 10-a (disposition of local revenues received from public improvement or service);
id. § 11 (taxes for certain capital expenditures to be excluded from tax limitation);
id. § 12 (further limitations on contracting local indebtedness authorized); id. art.
IX, § I (bill of rights for local governments); id. § 2 (powers and duties of
legislature; home rule powers of local governments; statute of local governments);
id. § 3 (certain powers of legislature as unimpaired; existing laws unaffected;
construction of article; definitions); id. art. XVI, § 1 (power of taxation; exemptions
from taxation); id. § 2 (assessment for taxation purposes); id. § 3 (situs and taxation
of intangible personal property); id. § 4 (certain corporations not to be discriminated
against); id. art. XVIII, § 1 (housing for persons of low income and nursing home
accommodations; slum clearance); id. § 2 (power of legislature); id. § 10 (power
of legislature; construction of article); see Feld v. Hanna, 4 Misc. 2d 3, 4, 158
N.Y.S.2d 94, 96 (Sup. Ct. St. Lawrence County 1956) ("right to tax is conferred
upon the state as a necessary attribute of sovereignty"); see also Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Town of Huntington, 85 Misc. 2d 800, 805, 380 N.Y.S.2d 466, 474 (Sup. Ct.
Suffolk County 1975) (power to tax vested solely in state legislature).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,

§ 1.
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and equal protection clauses 2' of the United States Constitution,
which provide that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
' 22
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Courts have broadly interpreted the due process clause and the
equal.protection clause to allow local governments substantial latitude
24
23
in devising reasonable taxation systems. An "iron rule of equality"
is nonexistent; states and localities retain sufficient flexibility to
develop reasonable methods of taxation. 25 Thus, the courts hold that
particular tax systems are constitutional if they have a rational basis
26
and are not arbitrary.
The broad authority of the state legislature to devise a scheme
for taxation permits flexibility in determining the amount of taxation, 27 and whether to grant specific exemptions from taxation.2 8
Exemptions must appear unambiguously in a statute. 29 The taxpayer
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Association of the Bar of New York v. Lewisohn, 34 N.Y.2d
143, 156, 313 N.E.2d 30, 36-37, 356 N.Y.S.2d 555, 564 (1974) (1971 statute
authorizing local taxation of real property owned by corporation that is not organized
or conducted exclusively for religious, charitable, hospital, educational or cemetery
purposes complies with due process and equal protection clauses of federal and
state constitutions); American Bible Soc'y v. Lewisohn, 48 A.D.2d 308, 313-14, 369
N.Y.S.2d 725, 731 (1st Dep't 1975) (real property owned by society unaffiliated
with any particular denomination did not qualify for property tax exemption available
to corporations or associations organized or conducted exclusively for religious,
charitable, hospital, education, or cemetery purposes), aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 78, 351 N.E.2d
697, 386 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1976).
24. Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526 (1958) (upholding Ohio
statute exempting merchandise of nonresidents from taxation if such merchandise
was held in warehouse only for storage); see also Trump-Equitable Fifth Ave. Co.
v. Gliedman, 87 A.D.2d 12, 18-19, 450 N.Y.S.2d 321, 325 (1st Dep't) (when
buildings are denied exemptions given to physically similar buildings, equal protection
is not necessarily denied, so Trump Tower could be denied § 421-a exemption
although Olympic Tower and Galleria received exemptions), rev'd, 57 N.Y.2d 588,
443 N.E.2d 940, 457 N.Y.S.2d 466 (1982), later proceeding, 98 A.D.2d 487, 471
N.Y.S.2d 580 (1st Dep't), rev'd, 62 N.Y.2d 539, 467 N.E.2d 510, 478 N.Y.S.2d
846 (1984). See infra notes 157-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Trump.
25. Allied Stores, 358 U.S. at 526-27.
26. See id. at 527; Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U.S. 146, 160 (1930) (act
imposing oil taxes graduated according to gravity held constitutional because not
arbitrary or unjustifiably discriminatory); see also Trump, 87 A.D.2d at 18, 450
N.Y.S.2d at 325.
27. Association of the Bar, 34 N.Y.2d at 156, 313 N.E.2d at 37, 356 N.Y.S.2d
at 564.
28. Id.
29. United Artists Theatre v. State Tax Comm'n, 76 A.D.2d 995, 995, 429
N.Y.S.2d 299, 300 (3d Dep't 1980) (admission fee charged for motion picture
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has the burden of establishing that he has fulfilled the criteria of
the particular exemption.3 0 Courts do not presume that an applicant
is entitled to a tax benefit." In fact, exemptions are strictly construed
32
against the taxpayer.
Administrative decisions to grant or to deny applications for tax
exemptions are often upheld by the courts. Under administrative
law principles, questioning the wisdom of particular decisions sua

theaters is exempt from sales tax, regardless of event for which patron gains
admission), rev'd, 52 N.Y.2d 1013, 420 N.E.2d 93, 438 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1981).
30. United Artists, 76 A.D.2d at 995, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 300.
31. See, e.g., People ex rel. Mizpah Lodge v. Burke, 228 N.Y. 245, 247-48,
126 N.E. 703, 704 (1920) (when realtor was unincorporated lodge of fraternal order
and owned building that it used and leased to other associations, such property
was not entitled to exemption); Schwartzman v. Miller, 262 A.D. 635, 636, 30
N.Y.S.2d 882, 884 (3d Dep't 1941) (although individual partners in sheet metal
and roofing business are subject to Unemployment Insurance Law, salaries paid
to their spouses are subject to payroll tax under subdivisions 1 and 3 of § 502 of
New York Labor Law), aff'd sub nom. In re Schwartzman, 288 N.Y. 568, 42 N.E.2d
22 (1942).
32. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Finance Adm'r of New York, 58 N.Y.2d 95, 446
N.E.2d 130, 459 N.Y.S.2d 566 (1983) (court of appeals ruled against tenants' argument that the tax levied under New York City commercial rent or occupancy tax
law was invalid because such tax was partially assessed against sums tenant paid
to landlord for janitorial services). The court stated:
Tax exclusions are never presumed or preferred and before petitioner
may have the benefit of them, the burden rests on [petitioner] to establish
that the item comes within the language of the exclusion. While it is
the general rule that a statute which levies a tax is to be construed most
strongly against the government and in favor of the taxpayer, the rule
is otherwise with respect to the taxpayers' right to exclude items from
taxation. In the case of statutory exclusions, the presumption is in favor
of the taxing power.
Id. at 99, 446 N.E.2d at 132, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 568 (citations omitted); see also
Engle v. Talarico, 33 N.Y.2d 237, 240, 306 N.E.2d 796, 798, 351 N.Y.S.2d 677,
679 (1973) (petitioner not entitled to depreciation deduction from her net rental
income, but was entitled to offset capital losses against capital gains. The court
subsequently cautioned, however, against narrow construction which might defeat
settled purpose); Pinelawn Cemetery v. Cesare, 90 Misc. 2d 736, 738, 395 N.Y.S.2d
984, 986 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1977), rev'd, 64 A.D.2d 607, 406 N.Y.S.2d
862 (2d Dep't 1978) (appellate division reversed supreme court's decision declaring
property owner not entitled to exemption for three parcels of its cemetery land).
33. See, e.g. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Dep't of Taxation & Fin.,
39 N.Y.2d 75, 80, 346 N.E.2d 796, 799, 382 N.Y.S.2d 958, 961 (state tax commission
properly assessed sales and use tax against vessels and supplies of corporation),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 832 (1976); Grace v. New York State Tax Comm'n, 37 N.Y.2d
193, 198, 332 N.E.2d 886, 890, 371 N.Y.S.2d 715, 720 (1975) (determination of tax
commission denying taxpayer's deduction confirmed); City of Lackawanna v. State
Bd. of Equalization & Assessment of New York, 16 N.Y.2d 222, 231, 212 N.E.2d
42, 47, 264 N.Y.S.2d 528, 535 (1976) (state board of equalization properly classified
properties as taxable).
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sponte is considered outside the purview of the judicial function.14
Thus, courts routinely uphold agency determinations that are neither
arbitrary or capricious. 3 5 The general rule is that the courts should
not intervene in administrative decision-making unless the plaintiff
objects in a timely manner and the agency's decisions are patently

incorrect .36
In the area of housing, courts take an expansive view of the
state's taxation power.3 7 For instance, the courts upheld legislation

enacted to alleviate the 1920's housing crisis in New York City.3"
In passing upon such legislation, the courts held that the state's

sovereign power in the taxing area justified the emergency housing
laws providing for tax exemptions, suspending possessory remedies
to regain possession of real property, and prohibiting landlords from
collecting unreasonable rents.3 9 For example, in EdgarA. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel,40 the United States Supreme Court reasoned that

the government was justified in resorting to the police power because
the housing crisis, had it continued unabated, would have harmed
34. See generally People ex rel. New York Lodge No. 1 of the Benevolent &
Protective Order of Elks v. Purdy, 179 A.D. 805, 810, 167 N.Y.S. 285, 287 (1st
Dep't 1917) (pursuant to claim filed by taxpayers, court ruled that administrative
decision denying tax exemption was proper); see also Board of Educ. v. Cole, 176
Misc. 509, 511, 29 N.Y.S.2d 59, 61 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1941) (pursuant to
claim filed by board of education, court confirmed orders by commissioner of
education directing board of education to submit to voters proposition regarding
construction of combined grade and high school).
35. See Sigety v. Ingraham, 29 N.Y.2d 110, 114, 272 N.E.2d 524, 526, 324
N.Y.S.2d 10, 13 (1971) (regulations of commissioner of health regarding nursing
home rates were consistent with public health statute); see also Park East Land
Corp. v. Finkelstein, 299 N.Y. 70, 75, 85 N.E.2d 869, 872 (1949) (in reviewing
determination of Temporary City Housing Rent Commission refusing certificate of
eviction, court is not to disturb decision if warranted under the record, reasonably
based on law, and neither arbitrary nor capricious).
36. See United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33, 37 (1952)
(district court should not entertain inappropriately timed objection to administrative
proceedings). In proceedings to set aside such agency determinations, plaintiffs
typically assert that the decision is illegal, arbitrary, an abuse of discretion, and
unsupported by the record. See Hamilton v. Diamond, 42 A.D.2d 465, 466-67,
349 N.Y.S.2d 146, 148-49 (3d Dep't 1973) (determination by commissioner of
education was not illegal, arbitrary or capricious).
37. See infra notes 38-41.
38. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242, 243-45 (1922)
(housing shortage in New York justified resorting to police power. In fact, state's
power is so broad that it may act outside area of taxation to solve housing
problems); Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170, 196-99 (1921)
(laws enacted regulating rights and remedies with respect to dwelling houses held
constitutional).
40. 258 U.S. 242 (1922).
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the public welfare.4 In People ex rel. Durham Realty Corp. v. La
Fetra,"2 the New York Court of Appeals pointed out that "[housing]
emergency may afford a reason for putting forth a latent govern'43
mental power already enjoyed but not previously exercised.
In addition, in Hermitage Co. v. Goldfogle44 the New York courts
upheld an exemption analogous to 421-a. The law in question in
Hermitage authorized local legislative bodies to exempt new dwellings

from local taxation, other than assessments for improvements, for
a ten year period. 5 The court held that the initiative complied with
the New York State Constitution. 46 Additionally, the program was
necessary in light of the housing shortage in the state. 47 In sum,

41. Id. at 245.

42. 230 N.Y. 429, 130 N.E. 601 (1921). The court held constitutional a statute
suspending for two years possessory remedies in New York City to regain possession
of real property. Id.
43. Id. at 445, 130 N.E. at 606 (housing emergencies resulting from other
emergencies such as floods).
44. 204 A.D. 710, 199 N.Y.S. 382 (1st Dep't 1923).
45. Id. at 717-18, 199 N.Y.S. at 387.
46. In passing upon the statute's constitutionality, the court reasoned as follows:
(1) the prohibition against private or local bills granting tax exemptions is not
violated merely because the statute happened to be of local application, id. at 72025, 199 N.Y.S. at 389-93; (2) state constitutional provisions requiring legislative
power to be vested in the New York Senate and Assembly permitted municipalities
the discretion to determine whether their particular housing conditions warranted
the tax exemption, id. at 725-26, 199 N.Y.S. at 393-94; (3) classifying structures
into old and new buildings to determine eligibility was reasonable and proper, id.
at 726-29, 199 N.Y.S. at 394-96; and (4) the exemptions authorized by the statute
did not render the law unconstitutional because the legislature's right to authorize
exemptions is a corollary of the right to tax. Id. at 729-31, 199 N.Y.S. at 39698.
47. Id. at 731-32, 199 N.Y.S. at 398-99. Despite decisions such as People ex
rel. Durham Realty Corp. v. La Fetra, 230 N.Y. 429, 130 N.E. 601 (1921), and
its progeny, see, e.g., Mars Realty Corp. v. Sexton, 141 Misc. 622, 626-29, 253
N.Y.S. 15, 21-24 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1931) (statute authorizing 20 year ex-

emption of new dwellings from taxation held not violative of equal protection
clause of United States Constitution or state prohibition against private or local
bills granting tax exemptions), questions remain regarding the scope of the legislature's power to authorize tax exemptions. Specifically, the constitutionality of
certain real property tax exemptions is uncertain in light of Akari House, Inc. v.
Irizzary, 81 Misc. 2d 543, 366 N.Y.S.2d 955 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975). In
Akari, the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment declaring unconstitutional a
statute extending the 25 year real property tax exemption for redevelopment
company projects. Id. at 544, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 958 (construing N.Y. PRrv. HOUS.
FIN. LAW § 125 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1987)). The plaintiffs alleged that the
statute was unconstitutional because the New York Constitution provides only a

limited mandate for granting tax exemptions-that is, exemptions must serve slum
clearance or low income housing purposes, and for a maximum of 60 years. Akari,
81 Misc. 2d at 544-45, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 959 (citing N.Y. CoNsr. art. XVIII, § 1
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(housing for persons of low income and nursing home accommodations; slum
clearance); id. § 2 (powers of legislature)). Thus, the exemptions should be discontinued because the areas are "pleasant residential communities no longer in
need of rehabilitation." Akari, 81 Misc. 2d at 545, 366 N.Y.S. at 959.
In rejecting the plaintiff's claim, the Akari court failed to reach the issue of
whether the legislature had power to grant tax exemptions to developers of multifamily units in non-slum areas. Id. at 547-50, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 961-63. Instead,
the court asserted that it was unnecessary to consider whether article XVIII is the
exclusive source of the legislature's power to authorize tax exemptions. Id. at 547,
366 N.Y.S.2d at 961 (construing N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII (housing)). The court
pointed out in dictum, however, that deeming article XVIII the sole source of
power would constrict the tenor of the legislation. Id. at 547-48, 366 N.Y.S.2d at
961. Article XVIII is not the origin of the state's tax exemption power in the-area
of housing. Id. at 548, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 962. Furthermore, article XVI and § 10
of article XVIII are permissive articles of authorization. Id. at 548, 366 N.Y.S.2d
at 962 (construing N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 1-6). Section 1 of article XVI states:
The power of taxation shall never be surrendered, suspended or contracted
away, except as to securities issued for public purposes pursuant to law.
Any laws which delegate the taxing power shall specify the types of taxes
which may be imposed thereunder and provide for their review.
Exemptions from taxation may be granted only by general laws. Exemptions may be altered or repealed except those exempting real or
personal property used exclusively for religious, educational or charitable
purposes as defined by law and owned by any corporation or association
organized or conducted exclusively for one or more of such purposes
and not operating for profit.
Id. N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 1. Section 10 of article XVIII provides:
The legislature is empowered to make all laws which it shall deem
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers.
This article shall be construed as extending powers which otherwise might
be limited by other articles of this constitution and shall not be construed
as imposing additional limitations; but nothing in this article contained
shall be deemed to authorize or empower the state, or any city, town,
village or public corporation, to engage in any private business or enterprise other than the building and operation of low rent dwelling houses
for persons of low income as defined by law, or the loaning of money
to owners of existing multiple dwellings as herein provided.
Id. art. XVIII, § 10. Finally, the purposes of article XVIII did not include limiting
the state's inherent power to accomplish valid goals in the area of housing. Akari,
81 Misc. 2d at 548, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 962.
Thus, Akari fails to present the definitive test for determining the constitutionality
of tax exemption statutes. For one, the court did not reach the constitutionality
issue since its discussion of the inherent nature of the state's taxing power over
housing was mere dictum. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 409 (5th ed. 1979) (dictum
is "an observation or remark made by a judge in pronouncing an opinion upon
a cause, concerning some rule, principle, or application of law, or the solution of
a question suggested by the case at bar but not necessarily involved in the case
or essential to its determination") (emphasis added)). Secondly, Akari was decided
by the New York State Supreme Court for New York County, a court of original
jurisdiction. Akari, 81 Misc. 2d at 543, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 955; see BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 991 (5th ed. 1979) (original jurisdiction is defined as "U]urisdiction
in the first instance"). Thus, the constitutionality of housing tax initiatives such
as 421-a will remain unresolved until the New York Court of Appeals decides this
issue. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 1 (establishment and organization of unified
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the legislature has broad power to establish rational taxation systems
48
and to grant tax exemptions.

B.

The Philosophy and Goals of Tax Incentives

Since the purpose of the 421-a program is to increase the number
of multi-family units, 49 it is termed an incentive program. 0 Incentive

programs are "tax expenditure[s] which [induce] certain activities or
behavior in response to the monetary benefit available." 5 ' Such
programs indirectly provide monetary assistance for particular goals

court system); id. § 2 (court of appeals and judges thereof); id. § 3 (jurisdiction
of court of appeals, New York's highest court). In other words, the extent to
which tax incentives may be provided in non-slum areas and for luxury housing
remains an open question. See generally N.Y.C. Housing Auth. v. Muller, 270
N.Y. 333, 342, 1 N.E.2d 153, 156 (1936) (article of state housing law providing
that city may set up an authority with power of eminent domain for purpose of
clearing slum areas to house low income persons does not violate due process
clause of state constitution or fourteenth amendment to United States Constitution).
The court stated:
Time and again, in familiar cases needing no citation, the use by the
legislature of the power of taxation and of the police power in dealing
with the evils of the slums, has been upheld by the courts .... The
fundamental purpose of government is to protect the health, safety and
general welfare of the public .... Its power plant for the purpose consists
of the power of taxation, the police power and the power of eminent
domain. Whenever there arise, in the State, a condition of affairs holding
a substantial menace to the public health, safety or general welfare, it
becomes the duty of the government to apply whatever power is necessary
and appropriate to check it. There are differences in the nature and
characteristics of the powers, though distinction between them is often
fine. But if the menace is serious enough to the public to warrant public
action and the power applied is reasonably and fairly calculated to check
it, and bears a reasonable relation to the evil, it seems to be constitutionally
immaterial whether one or another of the sovereign powers is employed.
The menace of the slums in New York City has been long recognized
as serious enough to warrant public action.
Id. at 339-41, 1 N.E.2d at 154-55 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Although
N.Y.C. Housing Authority substantiates the legislature's powers to stimulate low
cost housing in slum areas, it does not reach the issue of luxury housing in nonslum areas. Id. at 341-42, 1 N.E.2d at 155.
48. See supra notes 19-47 and accompanying text.
49. See Legislative Memorandum, supra note 9, at 2551.
50. See infra note 51 and accompanying text for a definition of the incentive
program.
51. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy:
A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 711

(1970) [hereinafter Surrey]. Tax incentives are generally inferior to the direct subsidy
as a method of achieving social goals. Incentives usually are more inequitable and
more difficult to administer than direct subsidies. Id. at 726-31.
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by reducing taxpayer liability-that is, by increasing disposable in52

come.
Commentators often criticize tax expenditures as invisible, inequitable, and regressive measures that squander scarce public resources.53 In addition, critics argue that the nature of tax expenditures
renders budgetary scrutiny and control virtually nonexistent.14 Con-

sequently, opponents of tax expenditures assert that such expenditures
56
tend to be economically inefficient" and overly generous.

52. S. SURREY & P. McDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 3 (1985) [hereinafter SURREY

& McDANIEL]. Disposable income is "[t]he income remaining to persons after
deduction of personal taxes and all other payments to governments-the total of
all individual savings and consumption expenditures." DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
134 (H. Sloan & A. Zurcher 5th ed. 1970) [hereinafter ECONOMICS]. Analogously,
the same principles should apply to a corporate taxpayer.
53. See RICH GET RICHER, supra note 11, at 8 ("troubling has been [New York]
City's growing penchant for relying on tax expenditures, as opposed to direct expenditures, to meet the housing needs of its citizens. It must be remembered that tax
expenditures are almost always entitlement programs, open-ended in their fiscal
generosity, and subject to little or no budgetary scrutiny and control"); see also
C. BRANCATO, Y. BRAUNSTEIN, J. PERICONI & E. HILLMAN, THE PROBLEM OF REAL
PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION: LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS 2-3 (1977). Brancato and his
associates maintain:
The complete removal of large blocks of taxable properties and the
nibbling erosion of taxable revenues from the myriad of partial exemptions
skews the entire system. This undermines not only the equitable basis
for property tax imposition, but also impedes the efficiency of the
system.... In addition, the amount of subsidy is not as visible and
accessible to scrutiny as other portions of a government's budget; taxexemption subsidies can be looked upon as 'invisible' budgetary expenditures since they do not appear on the expenditure side of the budget,
even though they represent a growing segment of revenue outlays and
their imposition results in shifts to other portions of the tax base.
Id. Scholars have debated how the government should promote desired objectivesthat is, by direct spending or tax incentives. See, e.g., SURREY & McDANIEL, supra
note 52, at 1-6, 25-27; Surrey, supra note 51, at 713-38. See generally Dolbeare,
The low-income housing crisis, in AMERICA'S HOUSING CRISIS: WHAT Is To BE
DONE? 29, 60-75 (C. Hartman ed. 1983) (discussing need to limit housing-related
tax expenditures).
54. RICH GET RICHER, supra note 11, at 8.
55. SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 52, at 82-83.
56. RICH GET RICHER, supra note 11, at 9. Section 421-a expenditures exceeded
New York City's capital commitments and were almost as great as the city's funded
operating expenses during fiscal year 1983. Id. City-funded capital commitments in
1983 equaled $15,724,000, city-funded operating expenses equaled $50,224,000 and
421-a costs equaled $48,100,000. Id.; see also R. KUTTNER, REVOLT OF THE HAVES:
TAX REBELLIONS AND HARD TIMES 170-71 (1980) [hereinafter KUTTNERJ. Kuttner
stated:
An audit by the city comptroller ... concluded that of [84] million
[dollars] in tax exemptions granted [from February 1977 to August 1978],
[56] million [dollars] needlessly went to subsidize projects that probably
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The significance of the magnitude of tax expenditures, such as
section 421-a, is compounded by the role of real estate taxes in the
local economy.5 7 Although some scholars contend that the property
tax is regressive," inequitable, 9 and disruptive of the housing market, 6°
would have gone forward without the tax subsidy. All told, New York
City has [15] billion [dollars] worth of property on its rolls which is not
taxed, thanks to one exemption program or another. Between 1973 and
1979, the exempt portion of the city's tax base increased from 35 percent
to 41 percent. And the taxes forgone equaled more than a hundred
million dollars yearly.

Id.

57. See C. MEEKS, HOUSING 287 (1980) [hereinafter MEEKS]. "The tax policies

of local governments, especially on property, affect housing. Property taxes influence

land price, use, and urban development. They also increase the cost of housing
and influence the size and distribution of disposable income." Id. (emphasis in

original).

58. Regressive taxes are defined as taxes which require poor families to pay a
larger percentage of their income in taxes than do wealthy families. PROPERTY TAX
REFORM 4 (G. Peterson ed. 1973). Progressive taxes impose a higher tax rate on
the rich than the poor. MEEKS, supra note 57, at 288; see also G. PETERSON, A.
SOLOMON, H. MADJr & W. APoAR, JR., PROPERTY TAXES, HOUSING AND THE CITIES
1-2 (1973) [hereinafter PETERSON & SOLOMON]. According to PETERSON & SOLOMON,
supra:
[T]he property tax is alleged to be a regressive tax, in the sense that it
seems to place a disproportionate financial burden on the poor, especially
[T]he
as compared to alternative[s] ... such as the income tax ....
property tax is compared to a sales tax which instead of being levied
on luxury goods, like jewelry or restaurant meals, is imposed on the
most vital of man's necessities: his home. This criticism is aimed at the
choice of property, especially residential property, as the tax base.
Id. Contra KUTTNER, supra note 56, at 195 (discussing challenge by revisionist
economists to view that property tax is regressive). Some revisionists "argue that
since the property tax is a tax on capital, eventually it must filter through the
economy to reduce the rate of return on all capital. Since by definition the owners
of capital are wealthy, the property tax must be a progressive tax." Id. at 195
(emphasis in original).
59. PETERSON & SOLOMON, supra note 58, at 2. "[T]he property tax is alleged
to have inequitable effects across jurisdictions, since wealthy communities are able
to raise a given amount of public revenue per household at lower tax rates than
are poor communities ....

[Ilt is the local character of the property-tax system

that is judged to be inequitable." Id. (emphasis in original).
60. Id. Scholars assert:
[T]he property tax commonly is thought to disrupt the operation of the
housing market ....

[T]he imposition of a tax is likely to lead to a

lower level of provision of the good in question. The housing market
is thought to be no exception. If this reasoning is right, an increase in
property-tax rates may lead directly to a lower supply of new housing,
or ...

it may discourage upgrading and rehabilitation of the current

housing stock and accelerate the decision of landlords in low-income
areas to abandon their housing altogether. Variations in the effective
rate of property taxation .

.

. should likewise affect the housing market,

since a comparison of tax burdens is one of the calculations that a
prudent household will make before deciding where to live.
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it remains the largest source of local revenue. 61 Therefore, by decreasing an important source of funds, exemptions such as section
421-a exert profound multiplier effects 62 on the economy.
Critics of the tax system also assert that housing tax expenditures
are inequitable since they favor those who invest in housing over
many other assets. 63 As a consequence, the construction of new rental
61. According to some scholars:
[P]roperty taxation continues to account for the bulk of locally raised
public revenue in the United States, just as it has throughout the country's
history. In 1973 total property tax receipts came to some $45 billion.
And the locally raised portion represented about 85 percent of all tax
revenue collected at the municipal level. While it is true that since World
War II the property tax has slipped into third place on the list of taxraising devices in the United States, falling behind the federally administered personal income and social security taxes, for many years the
share of property taxes in national income accounts has risen gradually
now standing at somewhat more than 4 percent.
Id. at 1; see SETTING MUNICIPAL PRIORITIES 1980, 18 (R. Horton & C. Brecher
eds. 1979); A Defense Against the Trump Tax, N.Y. Times, July 10, 1984, at 42,
col. 1 ("realty taxes produce about half of New York City's tax revenue"); see also
SWORDS, CHARITABLE REAL PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS IN NEW YORK STATE:
MENACE OR MEASURE OF SOCIAL PROGRESS 24-25 (1981) [hereinafter SWORDS]. Swords
P.

stated:
[R]evenues from the real property tax constitute the single largest source
of financing for local government. At one time property taxes were the
major means of financing local government services. There has been a
tremendous growth in intergovernmental grants to local municipalities
over the past sixty to seventy years, and as a result property taxes have
come to defray a smaller part of municipalities' operating budgets....
Property tax revenues ... remain ... an important continuing source
of funding for local governments. The certain availability of this revenue
source as compared, for instance, to the vagaries of intergovernment
grants contributes to its significance. For many jurisdictions the property
tax is the only available tax source. Only large cities have had success
with the sales and income taxes.
Id.
62. Multiplier effects refers to the far-reaching consequences of particular actions.
See ECONOMICS, supra note 52, at 292-93. "As applied to investments, [the multiplier
principle is] an explanation . . . as to the way in which an increase or a decrease
in new capital formation can cause cumulative effects in the national income through
consumer expenditures." Id. at 292 (emphasis omitted).
63. Downs, Too Much Capital for Housing, 17 BROOKINGS BULL. 1, 1 (1980)
[hereinafter Downs]. Downs stated:
Housing is no longer considered merely shelter. Many buyers now view
it primarily as an investment that allows them to accumulate capital and
to hedge against inflation.... [Hlousing as an investment offers extraordinary tax advantages compared to any alternative form of investment, such as corporate stocks, bonds, or even direct investment in small
business. . . . The attraction of homeownership is increased by the deductibility of interest payments and property taxes from taxable income.
Id. at 1-2. Contra How TAXES AFFECT ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 316-17 (H. Aaron &
J. Pechman eds. 1981) (discussing arguments in support of favorable tax treatment
of housing: (1) neighboring buildings benefit from improvement of one structure;
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units is often economically undesirable to real estate developers.64
Although the 1986 Tax Reform Act 65 includes provisions that are
expected to curtail certain mechanisms of financing and profiting
66
from real estate transactions, many benefits will remain intact. It
is against this backdrop that the 421-a program must be examined.

(2) property tax disproportionately burdens residential properties; (3) desirable to
encourage saving by low rate of taxation, and housing is form of saving; and (4)
homeownership should be stimulated because it produces better neighborhoods and
better citizens).
64. See Downs, supra note 63, at 3. According to Downs:
[Developers] cannot charge rents high enough to make new units pay,
since people would rather buy than pay rents sufficient to provide a fair
return. As a result, rental housing is not being built in most areas in
significant quantities. Moreover, existing rental units are being converted
into condominiums because people will pay far more to own them than
to rent them, thanks to the benefits of homeownership. These outcomes
are contributing to rental housing shortages in many markets.
Id.
65. I.R.C. (West Supp. 1987).
66. Scardino, Real Estate Loses Much of its Glory, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1987,
§ 12 (Financial Planning Guide: Your Taxes), at 46, col. 2 ("[als a result of last
year's tax act, the real estate ind..stry may no longer be the most favored child
of the Internal Revenue Code, but it is still part of the royal family of investments").
The article discussed the impact of the new tax legislation on real estate. Id. The
tax advantages include the leveraging of investment, the deductibility of interest
costs associated with leveraging, the ability to defer taxes on a home so long as
the profits are reinvested in a new residence within two years, and a one-time
exclusion on the profits up to $125,000 for those over 55 years old. Id. at 46,
cols. 2-3. The new tax law retains many of the benefits. Id. at 46, col. 3. The
lower tax rates, however, have decreased the after tax value of many of the
deductions. Id. In addition, the new tax law eliminates the special treatment for
capital gains and limits the ability to shelter wages or profits from the stock market
by paper losses. Id. at 51, col. 1. Depreciation schedules have been lengthened,
interest deductions have been limited, and the rules governing installment sales have
been curtailed. Id.; see also Report shows new law taxes housing market, Daily
News, Mar. 20, 1987, at 20, col. 1 (stating that developers are adjusting to new
tax law). In attractive markets, new projects are being developed with taxable bonds
and pension fund money that is loaned in exchange for sharing in the project's
income. Id. at 20, col. 2. In East Coast markets, characterized by high land costs,
developers are rehabilitating prime older buildings. Id. These approaches replaced
the tax-shelter syndications and tax-exempt bonds used in the 1983-86 real estate
boom. Id.; see also Real Estate syndication to top $12 billion in spite of new tax
law adjustment, Daily News, Mar. 20, 1987, at 22, col. 1 ("[real estate deals are
flourishing with a number of new financing methods taking hold and old favorites
getting new twists, despite a considerable adjustment to the new tax act"). Stan
Ross of Kenneth Leventhal & Co. stated:
At least the marketplace has a tax act and can function again within
guidelines and ground rules .....
Although once declared a dying breed,
we expect public real estate syndications to top $12 billion and private
deals to reach $3.3 billion in 1987, almost double the $6.3 billion in
public partnerships completed in 1986. One change this year is that most
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Section 421-a

This section will discuss the structure of section 421-a, as well
as its legislative history and purposes.
A.

Section 421-a Defined

67
Section 421-a of the Real Property Tax Law, enacted in 1971 ,68
69
provides for partial exemptions from local property taxes for de-

velopers who construct new multiple dwellings 70 in cities with one
million or more inhabitants. 71 The legislation applies to construction

syndications have a strong focus on yield or cash flow as opposed to
tax shelters.
Id. Other financing methods discussed by Mr. Ross include real estate mortgage investment conduits, passive income generators, master limited partnerships, publicly
traded partnerships, A/B partnerships, land leases and land sale-leasebacks, and
issuance of preferred stock. Id.
67. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987).
68. Id.

69. See infra notes 87-126 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 2.

71. The legislation limits the exemption to cities "having a population of one
million or more." N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(2)(a) (McKinney 1984). Only
New York City has the population required under § 421-a. See Nelson A. Rockefeller
Institute of Government, 1985 N.Y. ST. STATISTICAL Y.B. 2, 4. It is interesting to

consider this approach in light of the requirement that statutes be of general
applicability. See N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 1 (power of taxation; exemptions from
taxation) ("[elxemptions from taxation may be granted only by general laws"). In
addition, private or local bills granting exemption from taxation on real or personal
property are forbidden. See id. art. III, § 17 (cases in which private or local
bills shall not be passed). The purpose of these provisions is to prevent the passage
of legislation relating to private or local matters and to limit the legislature to
enacting only general statutes benefiting the state as a whole. Clay v. Saunders,
184 Misc. 143, 145, 52 N.Y.S.2d 837, 839 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1945). In
addition, these provisions are devised to restrict the legislature's ability to deal with
purely local matters. In re Burns, 155 N.Y. 23, 28, 49 N.E. 246, 247 (1898); In
re Henneberger, 155 N.Y. 420, 425, 50 N.E. 61, 62 (1898). It is difficult to devise
a general rule for determining whether a law is local. Id. at 425, 50 N.E. at 62.
See generally 56 N.Y. JUR. Statutes §§ 4-7 (1967). In determining whether a statute
is general, the courts look to the special circumstances of the case instead of relying
upon its form or language. Henneberger, 155 N.Y. at 425-26, 50 N.E. at 62. A
statute, although of general application by virtue of its language, will be deemed
a private or local statute if its conditions restrict it to only one particular case.
See id. at 426, 50 N.E. at 62. Tax exemption statutes have been upheld despite
appearing to be local or private. See People ex rel. 1170 Fifth Ave. Corp. v.
Goldfogle, 254 N.Y. 476, 478-79, 173 N.E. 685, 685 (1930); Ferguson v. Ross,

126 N.Y. 459, 464, 27 N.E. 954, 955 (1891). Ferguson held:
[Ain act embracing within its scope all the cities of the state, or all
things of a certain class, is a general and not a local act, although by
reason of some limitation, based on population or other condition, only
a particular city or the inhabitants of a single locality can in the actual
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commenced after January 1, 1975 and before January 1, 1990, which
is completed no later than December 31, 1991.72
Development must occur on land that, three months before construction began, was vacant, predominantly vacant, underutilized,
or improved with a non-conforming use. 73 The owner must continue
the
to pay the prior level of taxes during the ten-year period of
74
exemption as well as all assessments for local improvements.
The statute provides for a ten-year exemption from taxes on the
increased value of the land and on the value of improvements made
on it." During construction 6 and the first two years of the stipulated
ten-year period, the exemption encompasses the entire increase in
tax liability attributable to such improvements.7 7 For every two7 years
after that point, the exemption decreases by twenty percent. 1
Rental buildings constructed under section 421-a are subject to
the Rent Stabilization Laws. 79 The New York City Department of
Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) has the authority to

situation receive its benefits.
Id. See generally J. Bove, Constitutionality of legislation extending tax exemption
for redevelopment companies (April 11, 1974) (unpublished N.Y.C. Hous. & Dev.
Admin. Memorandum) (available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office) (discussing
constitutional limitations on tax exemptions).
72. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(2)(c)(ii) (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987).
These dates were modified in 1985, 1981, 1975, and 1973. Id.
73. See supra notes 4-7.
74. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(2)(b)(i),-(ii) (McKinney 1984).
75. Id. § 421-a(2)(a)(i) to -(v). The statute also authorizes exemption periods
of 15 and 25 years provided that certain additional criteria are met. Id. § 421a(2)(a)(ii)(A) to -(C) (McKinney Supp. 1987); see infra notes 116-22 and accompanying
text. The 25 year exemption also is available in areas where "construction is carried
out with the substantial assistance of grants, loans or subsidies from any federal,
state or local agency or instrumentality, or ... the local housing agency has
imposed a requirement or has certified that twenty percent of the units be affordable
to families of low and moderate income." N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(2)(a)(iii)(D).
This 25 year exemption is not available, however, in Manhattan for tax lots now
existing or hereafter created south of or adjacent to either side of one hundred tenth
street." Id. § 421-a(2)(a)(iii)(C).
76. The maximum construction period is three years. Id. § 421-a(2)(a)(i)(A).
"[C]onstruction shall be deemed 'commenced' when excavation or alteration has
begun in good faith on the basis of approved construction plans." Id. § 421-a(2)(g)
(McKinney 1984).
77. Id. § 421-a(2)(a)(i)(A) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
78. Id. § 421-a(2)(a)(i)(A) to -(E).
79. Id. § 421-a(2)(f). The legislation provides that after the exemption period,
the rents shall continue to be subject to such control. Decontrol may occur, however,
if the unit becomes vacant after the expiration of the period. Id. The exemption
also is available to developers of cooperatives and condominiums. Id. § 421-a(l)(c)
(McKinney 1984). The legislation does not limit the prices developers may charge.
Id. § 421-a(2)(f) (Supp. 1987).
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establish the maximum initial rent for the 421-a units.80 Although
the rents charged are regulated, tenants may be from any income
group.8 '
B.

Legislative History and Purpose of the Program

A shortage of housing, and the lack of construction of multifamily units in the municipalities of New York State, gave rise to
the necessity for legislative intervention in the form of a tax exemption for developers.82 In urging the legislature to enact the
421-a statute, 3 the Legislative Representative of the City of New
York asserted that increasing the number of safe and decent dwellings
in the state was a priority.14 The Representative justified the legislation's approach by referring to a similar program, enacted in

80. Id. §§ 421-a(3)(i) to -(iv), (4) (McKinney 1984). See generally Subsidy, supra
note 10, at R20, col. 3. This article asserted:
Over the course of the program, the average initial rent per room in
421a buildings in Manhattan has taken dramatic leaps, which is largely
explained by increased land costs. From 1974 through 1977, the average
monthly rent was $140. In 1978, the average jumped to $230 a room
and stayed there through 1980.
In 1981, the average rent increased to $387, and to $552 in 1982. In
1983, no average was calculated because there were too few new rental
buildings. In 1984, the average was $569. In 1985, the average jumped
to $770 because one building: Riverterrace, a 410-unit building [in Man-.
hattan] had approved rents of $1080 per room. [In 1986], the average
slipped back to $617.
Id.
81. See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(2)(f) (McKinney Supp. 1987) (statute
fails to exclude tenants based on income).
82. See Legislative Memorandum, supra note 9, at 2551 ("[tjhe housing shortage
afflicting the municipalities of this State is greatly exacerbated by the virtual cessation of new construction"). Contra Subsidy, supra note 10, at R20, cols. 3-4. The
article stated:
The original intent of the 421a program is shrouded in controversy. Some
say the 1971' program was sugarcoating on the pill of the Rent Stabilization
Law, enacted in 1969, which harnessed landlord income on a million
apartments. Others say it was intended to generate construction employment and was, only incidentally, a housing program.
City housing officials said the subsidy was supposed to encourage
residential contruction on underutilized sites-marginal sites, presumably,
where the subsidy would be an essential counterweight to the development
risks perceived by bankers and builders.
Id.
83. At the time that the legislation was enacted, it was referred to as the Section
421 program. The title later was changed to Section 421-a. See Ch. 110, § 1, 1 [1977]
N.Y. Laws 167 (McKinney). (current version at N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a
(McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987)).
84. See Legislative Memorandum, supra note 9, at 2551.
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1920, that provided tax incentives to reduce a housing shortage in
New York City following World War 1.85
The initial 421-a legislation applied to all newly constructed multiple dwellings with a minimum of ten units. 6 The legislature intended
a full exemption, limited to the value of the improvements,8 7 during

85. Id. ("[s]imilar conditions a half century ago caused the state legislature to
authorize local laws granting tax exemption[s] to new units for a brief period. This
program acted as a tremendous stimulus to new construction") (citation omitted).
The goals of the 1920's program and the controversy it engendered are analogous
to the goals of 421-a and the debate regarding its merits.
The wisdom of the law was not universally acclaimed. Many felt that
it would cause a serious loss of revenue to the city. Others objected to
it as class legislation, insisting that a shift in tax burdens would result.
Supporters of the measure pointed out that building operations were at
a complete standstill; without tax exemption[s], no new buildings would
be constructed ....

There existed ...

a choice between no buildings

with no tax, or untaxed new buildings. Since the exemption would
ultimately provide a great source of permanent revenue, the proponents
... argued that the city had little or nothing to lose financially and
much to gain in improved general welfare. Tax exemption was a far
wiser step than cash subsidies or public building.
HOUSING AND PLANNING COUNCIL OF NEW YORK, INC., How TAX ExBROKE THE HOUSING DEADLOCK r NEW YORK CITY 1-8 (1960) [hereinafter
HOUSING DEADLOCK]. The legislation stimulated a building boom.
CITIZENS'
EMPTION

Although [the] tax exemption stimulated new building, it did not achieve
the more general aim of lowering rents through an equalization of supply
and demand. The supply of buildings continued to increase for four
years, but so did the rentals, especially in low-cost housing. It became
obvious that, in spite of the limitations in the ordinance, the type of
multi-family housing being built was for that level of apartment dweller
who had never really felt the serious pressure of the housing shortage.
Low-cost housing was not being produced. Consequently, . . . the city
further limited the ordinance, granting to multi-family housing a total
exemption of only $15,000 per house. The limitation reflected the belief
... that multi-family housing did not really need the benefits of the
exemption. Rents in these new buildings, not subject to control, were
generally much higher than in the old buildings. The benefits of the
exemption were being retained by the speculators and the builders, rather
than being passed on to the tenants in the form of low rents. The
construction of multi-family housing did not decrease after the limitations;
the high rents were a sufficient inducement to build.
Id. at 1-10.
86. Ch. 1207, §§ 1-2, II [1971] N.Y. Laws 3124-25 (current version at N.Y. REAL
PROP. TA LAW § 421-a (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987)). Hotels were excluded from
the exemption. Id.
87. See id. The legislation further required the developer to pay at least the
amount of the taxes paid on the land and any improvements thereon during the
tax year before construction started. Id. In addition, the developer was prevented
from concurrently receiving any additional exemption. Id.
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construction and the first two years. 8 Thereafter, the exemption was
phased out gradually during the ten-year period.8 9
The legislation further mandated that rents charged on initial
occupancy after construction be at least fifteen percent less than
those in comparable newly constructed units. 9° The rents were to be
subject to the provisions of any local rent stabilization law for a
period of ten years, or the period of the rent stabilization law,
whichever was shorter. 9' When such time period elapsed, the rents
were to be decontrolled, unless any other applicable law would
92
mandate to the contrary.

Since the enactment of 421-a in 1971, the New York State Legislature and the New York City Council have modified it considerably. 93 The 1975 provisions, for example, altered the method for
determining the amount of rent that landlords could initially charge
in units constructed with the benefit of the exemption. 94 As was the
case under the 1971 legislation, the revised legislation provided for
decontrolling the apartments, unless any applicable law required otherwise. 95 In addition, the amendment expanded the number of eligible
96
units to include rehabilitated multiple dwellings.
In 1976, the legislature adopted amendments which related to the
ability of the local housing agency to rescind certificates of eligibility
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. The legislation was amended in 1985, 1984, 1983, 1981, 1978, 1977, 1976,
1975 and 1973. For a complete text of all the amendments, see Ch. 289, § 1, 4-5,
1 [19851 N.Y. Laws 679, 680-81 (McKinney); Ch. 288, §§ 1-4, 8, 1 [1985] N.Y. Laws
672-76, 678 (McKinney); Ch. 346, §§ 1-3, II [1984] N.Y. Laws 1939-40; Ch. 401,
§§ 7-8, II [1983] N.Y. Laws 1769-71; Ch. 995, §§ 1-2, II [1981] N.Y. Laws 2598-2601;
Ch. 655, § 111, [1978] N.Y. Laws 1334 (McKinney); Ch. 506, § 1, [1978] N.Y. Laws
900-904 (McKinney); Ch. 560, §§ 1-2, 1 [1977] N.Y. Laws 824-26 (McKinney); Ch.
110, §§ 1-2, 1 [1977] N.Y. Laws 167 (McKinney); Ch. 703, §§ 1-3, 2 [1976] N.Y.
Laws 1468-70 (McKinney); Ch. 857, §§ 1-3, [1975] N.Y. Laws 1368-74 (McKinney);
Ch. 480, §§ 1-2, I [1973] N.Y. Laws 1645-47; Ch. 1207, §§ 1-2, II [1971] N.Y. Laws

3124-25. For the current version of this law, see N.Y.

REAL PROP. TAX LAW

§ 421-a

(McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987). This Note will discuss only those changes deemed
pertinent to an analysis of the merits of the program.
94. Ch. 857, § 1, [1975] N.Y. Laws 1371-73 (McKinney) (current version at N.Y.
REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987)). The local housing
agency was charged with determining the amount of the initial adjusted monthly
rent. Id. at 1371. The legislation set forth a formula, which included such items
as the total project cost and the total expenses of the multiple dwelling. Id. at 1371-73.
95. Id. at 1371.
96. Id. at 1371-73.
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for an exemption.97 Specifically, the amendments provided that on
or after July 1, 1976, the agency could no longer rescind preliminary

or permanent certificates of eligibility. 9" The next amendment, in 1977,

extended the 421-a program for an additional four years.9 9
The 1978 amendments expanded the scope of the program by

eliminating the requirement that the buildings contain more than six
dwelling units. 1'0 The next series of amendments, in 1981, subjected
421-a non-condominium or cooperative units to the rent stabilization
laws. '

The amendments also authorized HPD to promulgate reg-

ulations eliminating certain geographic areas from the program.'
HPD could exclude areas that either: (1) no longer had a significant
need for tax incentives; or (2) should be used primarily as the site
03
for non-residential construction.

97. Ch. 703, §§ 1-3, 2 [1976] N.Y. Laws 1468-70 (McKinney) (current version
at N.Y. RgAL PRP'. TAx LAw § 421-a (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987)).
98. Id.
99. Ch. 560, §§ 1-2, 1 [1977] N.Y. Laws 824-26 (McKinney) (current version at
N.Y. REAL PROP. TAx LAW § 421-a (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987)). In setting forth
the reasons for extending the program, the New York City Legislative Representative stated:
[The program] ...

is responsible for and/or used in tandem with over

ninety per cent of New York City's new construction of residential multiple
dwellings, condominiums and cooperative housing. The construction industry is'a major source of employment for New York City. The middle
income residents attracted to these units represent a significant portion
of the city's taxpayers.
When this program lapsed in 1975 for three months, new residential
construction starts fell by 7507o. The financing institutions have expressed
concern about providing. construction funds or mortgages for structures
which may not be able to complete construction prior to the December
31, 1979 expiration date presently in the law, and they will soon act on
this concern through a negative, passive failure to commit funds.
Memorandum of Legislative Representative of City of New York, reprinted in
[1977] N.Y. Laws 2370-71 (McKinney 1977).
100. Ch. 506, § 1, [1978] N.Y. Laws 900 (McKinney) (current version at N.Y.
REAL PROP. TAx LAW § 421-a (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987)). In § 2, the legislature
exempted certain private dwellings and improvements from local taxation. Id. at
902-904 (current version at N.Y. REAL PROP. TAx LAW § 421-b (McKinney 1984
& Supp. 1987)). The new program, beyond the scope of this Note, was referred
to as section 421-b. See id. In 1978, the amendment clarified that the New York
City housing agency referred to in the legislation is the Department of Housing Preservation and Development. See Ch. 655, § 111, [1978] N.Y. Laws 1334 (McKinney)
(current version at N.Y. REAL PROP. TAx LAW § 421-a (McKinney 1984 & Supp.
1987)).
101. Ch. 995, 1 I(f), II [1981] N.Y. Laws 2598, 2601 (current version at N.Y.
REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987)).
102. Id. at 2600.
103. Id. at 2600-2601. Regulations designating preservation areas became effective
immediately. Id. at 2600. In contrast, regulations regarding areas no longer needing
exemptions became effective after two years. Id. at 2601.
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Amendments enacted in 1983 authorized certain cities to enact
local laws to "restrict, limit or condition the eligibility, scope or
amount of the benefits . . . in any manner, provided that the local
law may not grant benefits greater than those [already] provided . .. "104 Furthermore, the amendment eliminated from the
scope of 421-a rehabilitated multiple dwellings and multiple dwellings
resulting from the rehabilitation of existing non-residential buildings. 105
In 1984, the legislature adopted amendments mandating that buildings completed after January 1, 1974 remain stabilized through May
15, 1985, with the exception of those units subject to vacancy
decontrol. ° The legislature also enacted in 1984 a provision requiring
the New York City Board of Estimate01 7 to approve'any local law
restricting, limiting, or conditioning the eligibility, scope, or amount
of the 421-a benefits.108 Furthermore, the legislature prevented such
local laws from becoming effective until one year after their approval
by the Board of Estimate.' 0 9
In 1984, using authority granted by the legislature in 1983, the
New York City Council passed supplementary restrictions to the
421-a program. 110 The legislation limited eligibility in the following
manner: (1) areas in Manhattan qualifying for the exemption were
further reduced;"' and (2) sites formerly containing non-residential

104. Ch. 401, § 8, II [1983] N.Y. Laws 1771 (current version at N.Y. REAL PROP.
§ 421-a(2Xi) (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987)).
105. Id. § 7 at 1769.
106. Ch. 346, §§ 1, 3, II [1984] N.Y. Laws 1939, 1940 (current version at N.Y.
REAL PROP. TA LAW § 421-a (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987)). The amendment
included anti-harassment provisions-specifically, the apartment would remain stabilized if the commissioner of the housing agency or a court found that the apartment
had become vacant because the landlord or his agent had harassed the tenant. Id.
at 1939.
107. The New York City Board of Estimate consists of the mayor, the comptroller,
the president of the council, and the presidents of the city's five boroughs. NEW
YORK, N.Y., CHARTER ch. 3, § 61 (1986). See generally id. §§ 62-68 (discussing operation of board).
108. Ch. 346, § 2, I [1984] N.Y. Laws 1939-40 (current version at N.Y. REAL
PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987)).
TAX LAW

109. Id.

110. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 2, § 11-245 to -245.1 (1986).
111. Id. § 11-245. The code provides that projects within the excluded zone remain eligible for an exemption if one of the following criteria are met:
(1) [C]onstruction [is] carried out with substantial assistance of grants,
loans or subsidies from any federal, state or local agency or instrumentality, or (2) ... the department of housing preservation and development

has imposed a requirement or certified that twenty percent of the units
be affordable to households of low and moderate income, or (3) con-
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properties were required to be underutilized for at least thirty-six
12
months prior to commencing construction.'

The 1985 amendments limited the open-ended definition of "con-

struction period" to a maximum of three years.1"3 Furthermore, the
legislation restricted the geographical areas in New York City qual-

ifying for the exemption."

4

Within the excluded zone, however,

exemptions lasting up to a period of fifteen years" 5 would be available

struction [is] carried out pursuant to an agreement with the department
of housing preservation and development to create or substantially rehabilitate housing units affordable to households of low and moderate
income in a geographic area or areas outside the [excluded zone], provided
that the number of such low and moderate income units must be equal
to at least twenty percent of the number of units in the building [or]
buildings located in the [excluded zone] which receive benefits pursuant
to [§ 421-a].
Id. § 11-245(b)(l)-(3). The code authorizes the Department of Housing Preservation
and Development to promulgate rules and regulations to achieve the purposes of
the legislation. Id. § 11-245(e). Rules and regulations regarding these provisions
became final as of August 27, 1987. City Rec., Sept. 3, 1987, at 3099, col. 2. An
analysis of these regulations was impossible because of the publication schedule
for this Note. Specifically, data is needed regarding the number of units actually
constructed pursuant to the new regulations.
112. Id. § 11-245.1. The 421-a legislation merely requires that construction "take
place on land which, thirty six months prior to the commencement of such construction was ... under-utilized." N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(2)(d) (McKinney
1984). The legislation does not distinguish between land formerly improved with
residential as opposed to non-residential properties. Id. In contrast, the City Council's
legislation restricted the standard of underutilization with regard to sites formerly
containing non-residential properties. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 2, § 11245.1 (1986). The standard for land improved with a nonresidential building or
buildings is as follows:
[T]he underutilization of the land must have been such that each building
or buildings: (1) contained no more than the permissible floor area ratio
for nonresidential buildings in the zoning district in question and a floor
area ratio which was twenty percent or less of the maximum floor area
ratio for residential buildings, or (2) has an assessed valuation equal to
or less than twenty percent of the assessed valuation of the land on
which the building or buildings were situated, or (3) by reason of the
configuration of the building, or substantial structural defects not brought
about by deferred maintenance practices or intentional conduct, could
no longer be functionally or economically utilized in the capacity in
which it was formerly utilized.
Id. § 11-245.1(a)(l)-(3).
113. Ch. 288, § 1, 1 [1985] N.Y. Laws 672-73 (McKinney) (current version at N.Y.
REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987)).
114. Id. at 673-74.
115. Id. at 673. During the construction period, the exemption is 100o. Following the project's completion, the exemption is 100%70 for years one through 11.
Thereafter, the exemption decreases by 2007o each year. Id.
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only by fulfilling certain conditions. Specifically, exemptions would
be provided if: (1) the development was carried out with the substantial help of grants, loans, or subsidies from any federal, state,
local agency, or instrumentality; or (2) HPD had required or certified
that twenty percent of the units be affordable to low and moderate
income families.I16
The 1985 legislation also authorized a twenty-five year exemption" 7

provided that the project was situated in: (1) a neighborhood preservation program area; 1 8 (2) an area eligible for mortgage insurance
provided by the rehabilitation mortgage insurance corporation;" 9 or

(3) an area receiving funding for a neighborhood preservation project
under the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation Act. 20 Furthermore, the legislation extended the program to projects commenced
before January 1, 1990 and completed no later than December 31,
1991.121

In summary, as of 1985,122 the primary provisions of section
421-a include a ten year exemption 23 from an increase in property

taxes resulting from the construction of new multiple dwellings.

24

In Manhattan, the areas eligible to receive exemptions were sub-

stantially restricted. 125 Exceptions exist, however, enabling developers
who fulfill certain criteria to still receive exemptions within the
26
excluded zone.

116. Id.
117. Id. at 674-75. During the construction period, the exemption is complete.
Following the completion of the work, the exemption is 100% for years one through
21. Thereafter, the exemption decreases by twenty percent each year. Id.
118. Id. The legislation states that the local housing agency or the New York
City Planning Commission is to determine whether the site is within a neighborhood
preservation program area. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. (citing Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 81018146 (1983 & Supp. 1987)).
121. Ch. 288, § 2, 1 [1985] N.Y. Laws 675 (McKinney) (current version at N.Y.
REAL PROP. TAx LAW § 421-a (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987)). The prior legislation
required developers to start the projects before January 1, 1986, and complete them
by December 31, 1987.
122. This Note analyzes the modifications to the § 421-a legislation through
September 3, 1987. As of that date, the legislature had not amended the program
since 1985. See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAx LAW § 421-a (McKinney Supp. 1987).
123. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 15
and 25 year exemptions authorized under the program.
124. See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(2)(a)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
125. See id. § 421-a(2)(a)(iii)(C).
126. Id. § 421-a(2)(a)(ii)(C), (2)(a)(iii)(A), (2)(a)(iii)(D).
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Analysis of the 421-a Program and its Application to
Luxury Housing

While the residents of the South Bronx make do with vinyl decals
of potted plants stuck on abandoned buildings, the wealthy of
the Upper East Side get marble bathrooms and health clubs,
1 27
courtesy of the taxpayers.

This section will analyze the scope of the 421-a program. It will
conclude that the construction of luxury units, per se, does not
render the program undesirable. Luxury development contributes by:
(1) easing the housing shortage; and (2) strengthening the local
economy.
The New York City rental market, termed the oldest housing shortage in America,' 28 has been likened to a unique Rube Goldberg
contraption' 29-a contraption that is guaranteed to maintain the high
cost of rental units and thereby justify its continued existence. 130
Specifically, New York City residents face a "nightmarish ordeal"''
to find satisfactory housing, the number of federally subsidized lowincome apartments is insufficient,3 2 and the vacancy rate is extremely
low. 3 3 Furthermore, analysts predict that the availability of housing
will decrease even further in the foreseeable future, especially for
moderately priced rental apartments.

34

127. See A move to evict luxury nontax, Daily News, Sept. 18, 1984, at 12,
col. 3 (quoting Councilwoman Ruth Messinger).
128. Rent Curbs Foster Inequities Among Tenants, Experts Say, N.Y. Times,
June 3, 1985, at Al, col. 5 (quoting Dr. George Sternlieb, Director of the Center
for Urban Policy Research at Rutgers University) [hereinafter Rent Curbs].
129. Rube Goldberg contraption refers to "[a] much overcomplicated machine
or arrangement." NEW DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN SLANG 364 (R. Chapman ed.
1986).
130. Rent Curbs, supra note 128, at Al, col. 6 (quoting Dr. George Sternlieb).
131. RIcH GET RICHER, supra note 11, at 4.
132. Id.at 3.
133. Id. at 4 (vacancy rate refers to number of apartments offered for rent);
see also M. STEGMAN, HousING IN NEW YORK: STUDY OF A CITY, 1984, 3 (1985)
[hereinafter HoUsNG IN NEw YoRK]. The overall vacancy rate in 1984 was 2.04%.
Id. The rate was 2.13% in 1981. Id.The city lost 69,000 housing units from 1981-1984.
Id. at 8. During the same period, however, 81,000 units were rehabilitated or built,
resulting in a net increase of 12,000 units. Id.
134. RICH GET RICHER, supra note 11, at 4; see also The Illusive Low-Rent
Apartments, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1987, at R1, col. 2 (discussing difficulty in
finding bottom-of-the-market apartments in New York City) [hereinafter The Illusive
Apartments]; Tightening State's Grip on Housing, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1987, at
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The nature of the rental market in New York City results from
35
a confluence of factors. In particular, the city's rent regulations,'"
R6, col. 1 (explaining that shortage is of affordable apartments in decent condition
in neighborhoods where rental seekers desire to live).
135. The legislature found a "serious public emergency" in housing in New York
State when it authorized rent regulations. See N.Y. UNcoNsoL. LAWS § 8622
(McKinney Supp. 1987). The regulations must be based upon a finding of a local
housing emergency-a vacancy rate less than five percent. Id. § 8623(a). Once a
housing emergency is declared, it continues until the local governing body reaches
a contrary finding or concludes that the regulations fail to abate such emergency.
Id. § 8623(b); see THE REAL ESTATE BOARD OF NEW YORK, INC., 1985 HousNo
IN CRISIS: 1985, 15 (1985) [hereinafter HOUSING IN CRISIS].
Rent control has been in effect in New York City since 1942. Originally
enacted as part of the emergency wartime wage and price freeze, rent
control was designed by the federal government to curb temporarily the
inflation induced by the war effort .... It should be noted, however,

that the freeze, while doing nothing to help housing, also did little harm
because the costs of fuel, labor and materials were also frozen at that
time.
Rent stabilization, the successor program to rent control, was enacted
in 1969 to cover units in post-war buildings containing six or more
apartments, and has since been applied to units which formerly were
rent controlled. At present, about two-thirds of the stabilized units are
in pre-war buildings. It, too, was promoted as a temporary measure and
is designed to self-destruct once a 5 percent vacancy rate is achieved.
The problem is that the regulations themselves help assure that a healthy
vacancy rate will not be attained. By depressing income, they simultaneously discourage production and maintenance of the existing rental
stock while artificially increasing demand by capping rents below market,
or in some cases, even below cost of providing mandated levels of service.
Id.; see Rent Curbs, supra note 128, at B5, col. 3 (regulations increase costs of
new buildings so dramatically that rent necessary to make such buildings commercially viable can only be charged in Manhattan; and the regulations cause landlords
to abandon older housing stock); see also The Illusive Apartments, supra note 134,
at 20. Some owners contend:
[L]ow rents make it impossible to run a building, and, in the end, fan
antagonism between [the owners] and their tenants. [Owners] are especially
perturbed by instances where low-rent apartments are held by \people
who clearly can afford to pay much more.
[In addition,] when rents are too low to cover expenses and support
a reserve fund for emergencies, the buildings themselves deteriorate.
Id.; see State to Compare Rents with Incomes, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1987, at RI,
col. 2 (discussing study comparing rents charged in regulated buildings with incomes
of the residents). According to the study:
[New York City's] housing market is filled with anomalies and distortions
.that tend to turn reality on its head. There is a crushing demand for
housing, yet developers do not build anything affordable by any part
of the population but the upper middle class. Some people live in far
more space than they need, while others squeeze whole families into
closet-sized apartments. People who could afford to pay far more live
in bargain penthouses for decades, while working families on the lower
end of the economic scale move from place to place, paying more each
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the high costs of buying land and constructing buildings, 3 6 the city's
land use policies'3 7 and the conversion of buildings into cooperatives
and condominiums 3 ' have all contributed to the housing crisis. The
421-a program must be assessed within this context.
time for less of an apartment. Personal decisions such as when to marry,
or whom, or whether to have children, become, in New York, matters
of real estate.
Id. at R13, col. 1. But see Achtenberg, The Social Utility of Rent Control, in
HOUSING IN AMERICA: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 427 (R. Montgomery & D.
Mandelker eds. 1979) ("[wjhile rent control [in New York City] has not reduced
rents to levels that low and moderate income tenants would consider 'fair,' in
terms of ability to pay, it has left them considerably better off than they would
have been in an uncontrolled market"). Achtenberg states:
Past experience offers little evidence that control of the existing stock
has substantially deterred new housing construction. The volume of housing construction generally in the postwar period, and specifically in New
York City during the past 25 years, has not been out of line with available
In general, it appears that broader economic factorsresources ....
such as the availability and cost of land and mortgage money-are far
more critical than rent control in determining the volume of new housing
construction.
Id. at 429.
A more detailed analysis of rent regulations in New York City exceeds the scope
of this Note. For additional information, see Stegman, The Model: Rent Control

in New York City, in

THE RENT CONTROL DEBATE

29 (P. Niebanck ed. 1985).

136. See, e.g., Facing Up to the Housing-Supply Issue, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29,
1985, at RI, col. 2 (quoting John D. Schick, a partner at Widnell & Trollope, an
international cost consulting company) [hereinafter Housing Supply].
"There is no question that building in New York City is the most
expensive of any place in the lower 48 states. . ." Construction costs,
for example, are 30 percent more expensive than in Alabama, where
wage rates are half those in New York, and productivity averages 20 to
30 percent higher-and, in some cases, 100 percent higher.
Id. at R6, col. 2; The Controversy Over Apartment Tax Breaks, N.Y. Times, Oct.
21, 1984, at E6, col. 1. Real estate developers contend that the cost of constructing
buildings in New York City makes it uneconomical to develop anything other than
luxury housing. Id. Richard M. Rosan, of the Real Estate Board of New York,
asserts that development costs are $185 per square foot. This figure includes the
cost of land, bricks, mortar, architectural fees and interest. Id. Therefore, a 1,000
square-foot, two-bedroom apartment costs $185,000 to build. Id. Such an apartment,
he contends, would rent for $3,100 per month, assuming the landlord did not
receive an abatement. Id.
137. Rose, Rental Housing: A Sad Case, N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1986, at 23,
col. 2 ("[o]ur land-use policies rule out residential development of vast areas, such
as most of the lower West Side of Manhattan"). The author points out that housing
production in the United States has averaged 1.7 million to 1.8 million units per
year. Id. New York City should produce 50,000 units per year because it represents
three percent of the nation's population. Id. In practice, however, only 10,000
units are constructed during an average year. Id.
138. HOUSING IN NEW YORK, supra note 133, at 204 (estimates net loss of rental
units due to conversion as 42,612 units-3.1% of 1984 rental housing stock). Contra
HOUSING IN CRISIS, supra note 135, at 26-29 (discussing benefits of conversion).
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Proponents of 421-a contend that the program not only retains
the work force as residents but attracts new residents to the city as
well. 13 9 In addition, they argue that the young, well-educated, highly
paid tenants of 421-a buildings will contribute to the local economy.'40
Factors that strengthen the tax base include the following: (1) increased spending and taxes that tenants pay;' 4 ' (2) construction expenditures; 142 and (3) higher assessments on the property once the
exemption ends. 43 Thus, the cost of foregone tax revenue is more
than offset by the program's long-range benefits.'"

139. See K. FORD, HOUSING POLICY AND THE URBAN MIDDLE CLASS XVi-XVii (1978)
[hereinafter HOUSING POLICY].

140. Id. at 201. Ford contends:
The diagnosis of an adversary relationship existing between rich and poor
within cities is substantially fallacious. If the poor are to secure the
means of bettering their status, if bridges are to be provided to middle
class roles, then the presence of the more affluent is required to create
a healthy business climate. If a city is to have an independent income
which permits it to provide a unique and attractive variety of specialized
services, it requires a tax base of substance. A sturdy tax base is founded
largely upon the presence of the affluent.
Id. at xxiv-xxv.
141. See, e.g., id. at 201. "By encouraging ... new construction, New York
City is adding attractive housing options to its stock of dwelling units. These are
providing homes for young, well-educated, highly paid tenants ... who make
important contributions of their skills and their spending to the city's economy."
Id. "George Sternlieb .. . concluded that the costs of the Section 421 provisions
were probably exceeded by its economic benefits if the multiplier effects of spending
induced by the program were taken into account." Id. at 56-58 (citing G. STERNLIEB,
E. ROISTACHER & J. HUGHES, TAX SUBSIDIES AND HOUSING INVESTMENT 6 (1976)).
See generally id. at xiv. "[Tihe city economy is helped if housing policies increase
the number of city residents, specifically those who spend far more in private
goods and services in New York than they demand in services or payments supported
by the city treasury." Id.; see The 'Cost,' supra note 18, at R22, col. 5 (New
York City will receive $5 billion in taxes from residents of 421-a buildings that it
would not have received if such residents lived elsewhere).
142. See HOUSING POLICY, supra note 139, at 58 (citing D. FANKUCHEN, A
REVIEW OF REAL ESTATE TAX INCENTIVE PROGRAMS IN NEW YORK CITY, MARCH

1977, 16-17 (1977) ($20 million worth of new construction was generated by 421-a
during 1976, supporting between 680-850 jobs).
143. See Subsidy, supra note 10, at R20, col. 3 ("[in the last six years, the
[City's] finance department valued new 421-a projects at $3.5 billion and these
projects paid $313 million in real estate taxes. If the buildings had not been built,
the tax receipts on the undeveloped property would only have been a fraction of
that figure").
144. See The 'Cost,' supra note 18, at R22, col. 5.
[Olver the next 20 years the buildings receiving [421-al benefits [will]
pay nearly $4.5 billion in real estate taxes alone. The city will receive
an additional $5 billion in other taxes from the residents in those buildings
that it would not have received if they were living elsewhere. [The question
remains whether] $551 million is a lot to invest in order to generate a
total return of $10 billion?
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Citizens groups condemn the 421-a program and refer to it as a
scandalous waste of public funds that provides for the wrong economic constituency-upper-income individuals. 145 They argue that
the legislature should instead target incentives to low- and middleincome housing; wealthy individuals should not reside in buildings
receiving abatements.' 46 Additionally, some critics argue that developers would have constructed the luxury buildings regardless of the
exemption. 147
In fact, economists and developers explain that tax programs such
as 421-a that uniformly reduce development costs tend to increase
the value of land. 148 Consequently, "[1]and sellers . . . appear to be
the primary beneficiaries of [421-a] in that ... the benefits are
1 49
already incorporated in the price of the property being offered.'
.Accordingly, the ultimate value of 421-a to developers is diminished
because the exemption has stimulated the market thereby increasing
the price of land. 150
Citizens groups, on the other hand, point to the contrast between
the luxury housing market and its moderately priced counterpart."'

Even if one were to compute the present value (discounted for future
inflation) of ... future benefits [from 421-a] and compare them with
the current costs of the program, the cost-benefit ratio would still be
one to seven. In other words, even if six out of seven buildings receiving
421-a benefits would have been built without incentives, the program
would still have been a success. The one building in seven that would
not otherwise have been built will pay enough taxes to recoup the benefits
provided to the remaining buildings.
Id.
RICH GET RICHER, supra note 11, at 3.
146. Id.
147. See Subsidy, supra note 10, at R20, col. 5 (quoting Assemblyman Grannis).
Jeffrey Glick, the only major developer in New York who has completely ignored
the new 421-a program, stated: "Right now, I don't need 421a. People said
construction would end when 421a ended [in the restricted zone], but I'm building
and I don't find it to be a problem at all." Id. at R21, col. 4. Contra id. at col.
2 (Arthur Margon, Senior Vice-President of Real Estate Board of New York, stated
that "[tihe concept of foregone taxes is erroneous because a substantial number
of these buildings would not have been built without the program"). See generally
New Rules on 421a Tax Incentives, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1987, at R6, col. 3
("[slince developers do not have to figure full taxes in preconstruction cost projections, their projects become more economically feasible with 421a designation
and can be undertaken with normal bank financing").
148. See Subsidy, supra note 10, at R20, col. 5.
149. Id. (quoting Winthrop D. Chamberlain, partner at Orb Management Co.)
150. See id. On the other hand, some argue that development became more
dependent on 421-a to the extent that the exemption was incorporated into inflated
land prices. Id.
151. RICH GET RICHER, supra note 11, at 4.

145.
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Luxury condominiums, cooperatives and rentals, particularly in Man-

hattan, are largely unaffected by the problems of scarcity and decline. 152 For instance, the sales volume for condominiums increased
103 percent from $365,000,000 in 1982 to $738,000,000 in 1983.153
More than 2,325 new condominium apartments were prepared for
occupancy in 1983.154 Prices in these buildings ranged from $90,000
to $140,000 for studios, from $110,000 to $237,000 for one-bedroom
apartments, and from $256,000 to $645,000 for two-bedroom apartments.'
Despite the relatively strong market for luxury housing in Man-

hattan, such units have remained eligible for the 421-a exemption
since the program was enacted by the legislature. 15 6 The HPD promulgated regulations in 1976, however, which might have limited the
development of luxury units.' 57 These regulations defined the statutory
term underutilized land as "land or space which was substantially
underutilized by virtue of the fact that . . . it is occupied by functionally obsolete non-residential or residential buildings."' 5 s

HPD's use of these regulations in 1981 to deny the abatement
application for the Trump Tower represented a turning point in the

history of 421-a; its goals and criteria were brought into sharp focus
by the Trump-Equitable Fifth Ave. Co. v. Gliedman litigation. 15 9 In
152. Id.; see Housing Supply, supra note 136, at R1, col. 2 to R6, col. 1 ("private
developers in the city have found it feasible in recent years to build only for-sale
housing for middle- to upper-income buyers, or, occasionally, expensive rentals").
153. RICH GET RICHER, supra note 11, at 4.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAw § 421-a (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987)
(statute does not exclude luxury housing).
157. See Housing and Development Rules and Regulations Governing 421 Partial
Tax Exemption, § 4(b)(iii) (1976), quoted in Trump-Equitable Fifth Ave. Co. v.
Gliedman, 87 A.D.2d 12, 15, 450 N.Y.S.2d 321, 323 (1st Dep't), rev'd, 57 N.Y.2d
588, 443 N.E.2d 940, 457 N.Y.S.2d 466 (1982), later proceeding, 98 A.D.2d 487,
471 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1st Dep't), rev'd, 62 N.Y.2d 539, 467 N.E.2d 510, 478 N.Y.S.2d
846 (1984).
158. Trump, 87 A.D.2d at 15, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 323.
159. See id. at 12-20, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 321-26. Donald Trump, in a joint venture
with Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, constructed a 49-story
building with 266 luxury condominiums and 18 floors of retail and commercial
space on Fifth Avenue. Id. at 13, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 322. The tower was built on
the former site of Bonwit Teller and Company, whose 12-story building was
constructed in 1930 and subsequently demolished. Id. Prices for apartments started
at $407,000 for the smallest one-bedroom apartment. Id. The price of triplexes
was greater than $3,150,000. Id.
Donald Trump contended that the exemption should have been granted because
"a structure of greater height, more completely utilizing the site, might have been
a better utilization." Id. at 17, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 324. HPD denied Trump's ap-
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deciding the Trump case, the New York Court of Appeals examined
6°
the regulations in the context of the program's legislative history.'
In so doing, the court discovered that income restrictions were
nonexistent.' 6' Specifically, the housing shortage was discussed in
the most general terms; nothing was stated to imply that the program
62
was supposed to stimulate low- and middle-income housing.
The Trump court therefore found that the legislature had not
6
restricted the exemption to low- and middle-income housing. 1
"421-a requires only 'underutilization' of the land .... [Tihe statute
does not require 'substantial' underutilization."' Additionally, the
65
luxurious nature of the Trump Tower was irrelevant.
In reaching its decision, the court of appeals ignored the lower
court's reasoning that: (1) granting an exemption for the building
would provide an incentive for landlords to tear down numerous
buildings in prime locations throughout New York; and (2) it was
necessary to consider the aggregate impact of individual exemptions.166 In other words, more landlords might eventually be induced
to tear down profitable buildings so that they could also receive an

plication for an abatement "on the ground that the land had not been underutilized
within the meaning of the statute and the HPD regulation." Id. at 13, 450 N.Y.S.2d
at 322. Mr. Trump ultimately prevailed in the court of appeals. Trump, 62 N.Y.2d
at 547, 467 N.E.2d at 514, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
160. See Legislative Memorandum, supra note 9, at 2551, cited in Trump, 62
N.Y.2d at 542-43, 467 N.E.2d at 511-12, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
161. Trump, 62 N.Y.2d at 542-43, 467 N.E.2d at 511-12, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
162. See Legislative Memorandum, supra note 9, at 2551 ("[n]o efforts should
be spared to increase the number of safe and decent dwelling units in our cities"),
cited in Trump, 62 N.Y.2d at 542-43, 467 N.E.2d at 511-12, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 848;
see also Teleon Realty Corp. v. City of New York, 88 Misc. 2d 767, 771, 391
N.Y.S.2d 282, 285 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1977) ("statute has a specific and limited
purpose: to encourage residential construction"), modified, 68 A.D.2d 858, 414
N.Y.S.2d 566 (1st Dep't 1979), aff'd, 50 N.Y.2d 824, 407 N.E.2d 1346, 430 N.Y.S.2d
50 (1981).
163. Trump, 62 N.Y.2d at 543, 467 N.E.2d at 512, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
164. Id. at 545, 467 N.E.2d at 513, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 849.
165. Id. at 543, 467 N.E.2d at 512, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
166. The appellate division stated:
It may well be that the site was not occupied for its highest and best
use. Trump argued that a structure of greater height, more completely
utilizing the site, might have been a better utilization. If we accept that
view of underutilization, it would have to be concluded that most sites
in Manhattan, and perhaps elsewhere in the city, should also be included
within the compass of the statute, because larger or taller buildings might
better utilize the space. This would amount, in effect, to a universal tax
exemption hardly consonant with the statutory purpose.
Trump, 87 A.D.2d at 17, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 324-25.
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exemption. 67 The court of appeals did not address this issue, and
instead focused on the statute's objective criteria. 68
By deciding in favor of an exemption, the court of appeals created
a public relations nightmare for Mayor Edward I. Koch's administration.' 69 The Trump Tower, a symbol of wealth and power on
Fifth Avenue, 70 became a blatant reminder that 421-a is not restricted
to low-income housing or to the poorest neighborhoods. Thus, critics
called the decision "outrageous." ' ' 7' Debate regarding the merits of
the program crystallized. Opponents of the ruling asserted that the
167. Cf. id. (more landlords would be able to argue that their property was
underutilized).
168. See Trump, 62 N.Y.2d at 545-47, 467 N.E.2d at 513-14, 478 N.Y.S.2d at
849-50.
169. See infra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
170. See Trump Finds Big "Bonus" on 5th Ave., N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1986,
at 33, col. 3. The article explains:
[A] 61-story building ... the tower has already produced a sizeable

fortune for Mr. Trump and his partner, the Equitable Life Assurance
Society of the United States, from the sale of the apartments on the
upper floors. The 251 sold so far have brought in $277 million ....
And when the last 15 are sold-Mr. Trump says they have done so well
he may buy them himself-the partners will split a profit of $87 million.
Mr. Trump and Equitable are also earning nearly $1 million a month
from the commercial and retail space that make up the bottom third
Mr. Trump put the cost of the project at $190 million, "including
land, construction, fees, everything." That's about $235 per square foot,
expensive even by New York standards but not out of bounds. As Mr.
Trump points out, the partners have already recovered more than that
from the sale of the condominiums.
Id. at 33, col. 3 to 44, col. 2.
171. Top State Court Rules Trump Is Entitled to Tax Break for Midtown Tower,
N.Y. Times, July 6, 1984, at Bl, col. 1. Mayor Koch sharply criticized the decision:
Most people in this state, including me, believe that [421-a] was intended
to stimulate much-needed housing construction in areas where no housing
would otherwise be built. Now the Court ... has found that some of

the most expensive and luxurious accommodations, not only in the United
States but in the world, are entitled to a tax break. Does that make
sense? Not to me.
Id. at B1, cols. 1-2. Certain of the Mayor's critics questioned the sincerity of his
opposition to the decision. New York Assemblyman Pete Grannis and New York
State Senator Fritz Leichter accused the Mayor of shedding "crocodile tears" over
the decision because he could have pushed for restrictions on the program before
the 1984 amendments were adopted. Call Koch False, Daily News, July 10, 1984,
at Ml, col. 3. Newsday concurred with this viewpoint. Trimming the City's Tax
Breaks, N.Y. Newsday, July 16, 1987, at 40, col. 1 (1984 amendments added
additional requirement of Board of Estimate approval of amendments to the
legislation and one-year lag was also imposed); see supra notes 107-109 and accompanying text.
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building is at a prime location and that it would have been constructed
without any assistance being provided.

72

As is the case with many controversial issues on the public agenda,
rhetorical posturing frequently takes the place of common sense and
logic. Critics ignore the achievements of the program-21,253 condominiums and 42,389 rental units were constructed under 421-a.17 1
In a city characterized by a low vacancy rate 74 and high construction
costs, 75 even luxury units should be considered a welcome addition.
Specifically, new luxury units increase the supply in the housing
market. 7 6 As a result, moderately priced housing that would have
remained occupied becomes available to other renters. 77
In addition, the inhabitants of luxury buildings are helping to
solidify the city's tax base.' 78 Finally, improvements to the land
ultimately lead to a higher tax rate for the 421-a sites. 79 Thus, the
legislature should continue the 421-a program, subject to the modifications discussed below. 8 0

172. See No More Giveaways on Taxes, N.Y. Newsday, Sept. 26, 1984, at 64,
col. 1. See generally Schanberg, Tax Breaks Never Die, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22,
1984, at 25, col. 1. Schanberg stated:
In New York City, tax concessions for those who don't need them never
die. In fact, they don't even seem to fade away ....

[T]he waste of

tax dollars continues, in large amounts. The latest giveaway involves ...
[§1 421-A ....

No one imagined in 1971 that the Trump Tower, on

"underutilized" Fifth Avenue, would qualify for these tax gifts, but it
has them-$40 to $50 million worth.
Id.
173. See Subsidy, supra note 10, at RI, col. 3. See generally Sellers Finding
Condo Resales Shaky, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1987, at RI, col. 2. "[Sjpurred by
revisions in ...

421-a ...

developers expect to complete more than 11,000 [con-

dominium] units by the end of next year. Before the current rush, Manhattan had
barely 20,000 condominiums-some in converted rental buildings, but most of them
in buildings erected within the past few years." Id. at R20, col. 1.
174. See supra notes 133, 135 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
176. See Subsidy, supra note 10, at R21, col. 2 (citing Arthur Margon, Senior
Vice-President of Real Estate Board of New York).
177. Id.; see Q. & A. With a Philosopher-Expert on City's Housing, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 9, 1986, at R7, col. 1 (interview with Louis Winnick, retired VicePresident of Ford Foundation). Winnick opined:
If a shallow subsidy for the affluent can induce them to upgrade, it will
leave decent housing for people less well fixed than they are. Studies
have shown that when a new unit is occupied somewhere between three
or four families are accomodated through the chain of moves that follows.
Id. at R18, col. 5.
178. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 111. An analysis of the 1987 regulations designed to provide
affordable apartments to persons earning 800 of the area's median income was im-
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Recommendations

The legislature should continue to authorize the 421-a tax exemptions. Modifications to the existing legislation, however, are
necessary. Specifically, the legislature should restrict 421-a to rental
housing.' 8 '
As this Note indicates, the tax system provides adequate incentives
for constructing and purchasing luxury cooperatives and condominiums. 8 2 The necessity for providing any additional incentives to
construct such housing is dubious. 8 3 With respect to rental housing,
however, legitimate arguments exist that tax exemptions provide a
84
much needed stimulus. 1
An income restriction on the inhabitants of 421-a buildings ought
not exist. As studies by Kristina Ford, George Sternlieb, Elizabeth
Roistacher, and James Hughes indicate, the benefits of luxury development exceed the costs, and the residents of these buildings have
strengthened the tax base.' 8 5
Legislation should prevent landlords from circumventing the intent
of this proposal-to increase the number of available rental units.
Specifically, the legislation should prohibit landlords from receiving
a windfall by immediately converting 421-a buildings at the end of
the exemption period. If a landlord would like to convert within
ten years after the exemption period, he should be required to
reimburse the city a proportional amount. Thereafter, landlords
should be free to convert 421-a buildings. Allowing developers to
ultimately convert buildings should facilitate neighborhood development and stability,8 6 while preventing an abuse of the exemption.

possible because of the publication schedule for this Note. Data is necessary regarding the number of units constructed under this new program and the income of the
residents.
181. These recommendations are not meant to be all-inclusive. For instance,
reforming the real estate tax assessment system, mandating that tax expenditure
legislation include sunset provisions, requiring increased financial disclosure by
landlords in order to set more reasonable rent guidelines, and eliminating the rent
regulation system might increase the development of multi-family housing in New
York City. These reforms, however, exceed the scope of this Note. See generally
Appel testimony, supra note 16, at 3-4 (proposes modifications to 421-a legislation).
182. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
183. Id.
184. See supra notes 128-37, 147 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
186. See OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN
DEV., THE CONVERSION OF RENTAL HOUSING TO CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVES:

A

NATIONAL

STUDY

OF SCOPE, CAUSES

AND IMPACTS

VIII-1 to VIII-36.
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Conclusion

Enhanced development of housing by the private sector is vital
to the continued economic growth of New York City. Nonetheless,
the present approach is an inefficient use of tax dollars. Once
modified, however, 421-a should continue.
The high cost of developing buildings, the rent regulation system,
and the low vacancy rate of rental units dictate that incentives remain
available to developers of rental buildings. New York City will
continue to benefit from the increased housing stock constructed
under the 421-a program.
Deborah Ann Konopko

Most converted buildings in central cities are in sound condition and
generally undergo little or no major repairs at the time of conversion.
In these cases, there is little short-term impact on the buildings' condition.
However, in the longer run, these buildings may be better maintained
than if they had remained in the rental stock.
A considerable number of conversions, particularly those in revitalizing
neighborhoods, undergo major rather than cosmetic changes at the time
of conversion. For these buildings, conversion contributes to structural
improvement.
Id. at VIII-31.

